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Enrique  G.  Mendoza,  University  of  Maryland  and  NBER 
This  paper  undertakes  an empirical  analysis  of the degree  of financial  in- 
tegration  across EU regions and its determinants.  The starting  point is 
an innovative measure of gross regional income for EU regions con- 
structed  by the authors  using survey data.  This  measure  is then used to 
run  two types of panel regressions  to examine  the degree of financial  in- 
tegration  and the variables  that  drive it: 
1. Diversification  finance  regressions 
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2. Development  finance  regressions 
/output\  - 
[income} 
= ^ +  8X'  +  a°  ln(GDP)l  +  7(Xl  "  ^ 
- 
ln(GDP)/  +  e" 
These regressions  are based on a canonical  theoretical  framework  of fi- 
nancial  integration  that  yields the prediction  that,  under  full financial  in- 
tegration,  the coefficient  a should be equal to the share  of capital  income 
in gross domestic  product  (GDP).  The  key findings  of the paper  are  that: 
(a) EU regions are less integrated than predicted by theory, (b) there 
is little evidence that country-level  institutions matter,  but (c) regions 
where confidence  is higher  are  more integrated  in terms  of the indicator 
derived from theory. 
This is one more contribution  adding to the very interesting  research 
program  of the authors  looking  at the empirical  implications  of financial 
integration.  The construction  of regional income data for the EU was 
done in a clever  way, and the database  they produced  is likely to be used 396  Mendoza 
in many other research  applications.  In my discussion I will focus on 
three  main  points:  first,  I will argue  that  the empirical  classification  of de 
facto versus de jure financial  integration  commonly used in the litera- 
ture  is misleading  at best and should be discarded.  In the case of this pa- 
per,  the authors  should contrast  their  results  with those obtained  by us- 
ing a de jure  measure.  Second,  I will discuss some important  limitations 
of the theoretical  framework  on which the empirical  analysis  is based.  In 
particular,  I will argue that the inability to track cross-regional  asset 
portfolios makes it difficult to argue that the estimated a coefficient  is 
a measure of financial  integration.  Third,  I will make some comments 
about the policy implications  of the analysis. 
Why is the de facto de jure  classification  misleading?  The problem  is 
that this classification  is logically flawed because it confuses an action 
(financial  integration)  with the outcome of that  action (the  volume of fi- 
nancial asset trading).  Financial  integration  is defined as the removal of 
distortions and barriers  affecting asset trading across countries,  or in 
this case across  regions in the EU. It is an issue largely about actions  of 
policy (which in the case of the EU relate  to the removal  of capital  con- 
trols  of all kinds that  are  very well documented  to have taken  place dur- 
ing the 1980s  and early 1990s),  and it is also about  technological  innova- 
tions that have enhanced the efficiency of financial  asset transactions 
significantly.  Financial  asset  trading,  on the other hand, is defined as the 
magnitude  of gross and net financial  flows that  results  from  a particular 
economic  environment,  including  in this case the degree of financial  in- 
tegration. 
The problems  with the de facto  de jure  classification  of financial  inte- 
gration can be illustrated  with three examples that show why the de 
facto measure can be very wrong: first,  it is possible to construct  theo- 
retical  examples in which countries  can have full financial  integration 
but zero asset  positions  and zero credit  flows (e.g.,  a multicountry  model 
with fully integrated,  complete markets  of contingent claims but per- 
fectly correlated  country-specific  incomes). Here, there is full financial 
integration  de jure, but the de facto measure would indicate financial 
autarky!  Second, it is also possible to construct  a theoretical  model in 
which capital controls  or asset trading costs are present,  but countries 
maintain large positive or negative net foreign asset (NFA) positions 
(see, for example, Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones  2007). Here, the de 
facto  measure  could indicate  a high degree of capital  mobility,  while the 
de jure measure  would indicate  the opposite. Third,  consider the well- 
known case of the saving-investment correlations,  which have been Comment  397 
proven  to be an inadequate  measure  of the degree  of capital mobility 
(see Obstfeld 1986, and Mendoza  1991). For example, it has been shown 
that depending  on the persistence  of the shocks that drive output fluc- 
tuations, the saving-investment  correlation can be positive  or negative 
in model  economies  assumed  to have perfect capital mobility. This ex- 
ample shows  another instance in which  an outcome  (now  the saving- 
investment correlation rather than the gross or net capital flows) cannot 
be used as a indicator of financial integration. 
In short, the authors' empirical analysis is about the determinants  of 
net factor payment  flows across EU regions, which is a very interesting 
topic on its own, but it is not about financial integration. To examine the 
latter, the authors would need to explore similar experiments as the ones 
conducted  in the paper, but use the standard (de jure) measures  of fi- 
nancial integration, such as that constructed by Chinn and Ito (2005). 
The  theoretical  benchmark  that  anchors  the  empirical  analysis  is 
based  on  three key  premises:  (a) Ex-ante arbitrage of differentials  in 
marginal products of capital allocated to each region, K{,  under perfect 
foresight, R =  aAfK^L]^1 =  R{  Vf; (b) constant shares of ownership  of 
global  capital by each region,  &.;  and  (c) a conjecture about portfolio 
structures according to which,  if ownership  is fully diversified,  capital 
in a region  will  be  mainly  owned  by  nonresidents.  Under  these  as- 
sumptions,  the GDP-GNI ratio in a region reduces to: 
GDPt/GNI; E=£  l/[a<|>,.(K/JQ  + 1 -  a]. 
Notice that both the ratio of capital allocated to the region relative to to- 
tal global capital (K{/K) and the region's ownership  share of global cap- 
ital <(>,  matter. Given that physical capital is significantly  more costly to 
adjust than financial capital, it is quite likely that over the seven-year pe- 
riod used in the empirical analysis ownership  shares moved  more than 
physical capital allocations. This issue points to the fact that, in order to 
use this theoretical framework to derive robust testable predictions, the 
analysis  needs  to include  a theory of ownership  shares (i.e., portfolio 
choice). 
Unfortunately,  the  determination  of  well-defined  cross-country  or 
cross-region  portfolio  structures is a difficult task. Under perfect fore- 
sight  and perfect financial integration,  or under  uncertainty  but with 
complete markets of contingent claims, marginal returns are fully arbi- 
traged, but precisely because of that portfolio structures are indetermi- 
nate. Agents are indifferent across portfolio structures because all assets 
yield  the same returns. Moreover, ignoring  uncertainty  is likely  to be 398  Mendoza 
problematic  because  uncertainty  is a key factor  driving  portfolio  choice. 
But  canonical  portfolio  models have well-known problems  of their  own 
in terms of accounting  for observed portfolios.  In particular,  they find 
it hard to explain the substantial  home bias in the portfolios  of agents 
resident in EU counties that still remains. Baele, Pungulescu, and Ter 
Horst (2007)  show that  the country  time series means of the percent  dif- 
ference relative to optimal international  capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM)  portfolios range from 55 percent in Belgium to 99 percent in 
Poland.  This  evidence,  albeit  not aligned  by regions  as in the paper,  casts 
serious doubt on the paper's key assumption that a region's capital is 
largely  owned by nonresidents.  In addition,  as the recent  work in mod- 
eling international  portfolios under uncertainty  and incomplete mar- 
kets in dynamic stochastic  general equilibrium  (DSGE)  models shows 
(e.g., Devereux  and Sutherland  2006;  van Wincoop  and Tille  2007),  pin- 
ning down closed-form  solutions for optimal portfolio structures  that 
can be tested by standard  empirical  tools may not be feasible. 
Another issue with the theoretical  framework  relates to the poten- 
tially important  role that differences  in regional  capital  valuations  due 
to adjustment  costs, depreciation  rates, and taxes can play, even in a 
canonical  perfect  foresight  setup. If we modify the authors'  framework 
to consider  the typical  capital-adjustment  costs behind Tobin's  Q model 
of investment,  and differences  in country-  and region-level  tax rates  on 
dividends tJ  4  and capital  gains t£., the arbitrage  condition  under full fi- 
nancial  integration  becomes: 
EQ  (1 -  ^[aAft-VrdJ  + (1 -  frfr+x  R ￿￿￿￿  ...R,.  V, 
where dci  is a depreciation  rate that varies across countries  and/or re- 
gions and qt  is Tobin's  Q (which differs  from unity due to marginal  ad- 
justment  costs,  which in turn  depend on the position of the region's  cap- 
ital at date t relative  to its long-run  trend).  In this case, it will no longer 
be true that estimating a coefficient  a equal to the share of capital on 
GDP is evidence of full financial  integration,  since this prediction  was 
derived using the simple arbitrage  condition  without taxes and adjust- 
ment costs. 
These issues are likely to be relevant  not just as theoretical  points but 
also for the empirical  analysis. Countries  and regions in the EU are at 
different  stages of the growth dynamics of their capital  stocks, so their 
Tobin  Qs are likely to vary widely (consider,  for example,  Spain  versus Comment  399 
the U.K., Greece versus France,  East Germany  versus West Germany, 
Southern  Italy  versus Northern  Italy,  etc.). Moreover,  tax rates on capi- 
tal income differ significantly  across  countries  in the EU (see Mendoza 
and Tesar  2005).  Country  dummies can pick up the effects of these dif- 
ferences  only as long as tax differences  are purely country-specific,  but 
it is very likely that  tax rates  also vary by region. 
Setting  aside the limitations  of the theory  behind the empirical  tests, 
some aspects  of the quantitative  results  are controversial  and can affect 
the policy implications  of the analysis.  One key issue is whether  institu- 
tions at the country  level can be as clearly  separated  from regional  trust 
and confidence  as the paper suggests. Confidence  is easier to gain and 
maintain  with strong  institutions,  and similarly,  institutions  are  likely to 
be stronger  and more stable  when confidence  is high. Moreover,  finan- 
cial contracts  clearly  depend on trust  and confidence,  but these are also 
dependent at least in part on institutional  enf  orceability.  A second con- 
cern  is that the empirical  findings are strong for confidence,  and less so 
for trust,  but the confidence  measure  is a very mixed bag that includes 
confidence in church, army,  education, media, unions, police, legisla- 
tive, bureaucracy,  social security,  corporations,  judiciary,  EU, NATO, 
and so forth.  Looking  at this list it is hard to see how the data can split 
confidence  from  institutions,  and the list includes many more aspects  of 
confidence and/or  institutions than the key ones for financial flows 
(which  would be mainly corporations  and judiciary).  The paper should 
explore  the robustness  of the results  to redoing this part  of the analysis, 
considering  only these two components  of the confidence  data. 
In summary,  this paper undertakes  a very interesting  empirical  anal- 
ysis of the determinants  of cross-region  capital flows in the EU, using 
an innovative  measure  of regional  income  based on survey data.  It con- 
cludes after  a careful  empirical  investigation  that the data support the 
hypothesis that confidence  matters  for cross-region  capital flows. Tak- 
ing this result at full value, setting aside all my previous comments, it 
seems that  the big unanswered  question  that  remains  is:  what can coun- 
tries  or regions  do about  confidence?  In this regard,  we seem to arrive  at 
a conclusion  that  is widely agreed  on:  the development  of institutions  or 
confidence  levels that anchor  financial  markets  is an important  precon- 
dition for a successful  process of global financial  integration  (see Rajan 
and Zingales 2003, and Mishkin 2006). The hard part is to figure out 
what strategy  countries  or regions can follow to develop their institu- 
tions and enhance  confidence. 400  Mendoza 
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